Introduction
The outcome of Cost Bene…t Analysis (CBA) of public projects with intergenerational consequences is notoriously sensitive to the discount rate employed. Small variations in assumptions can lead to very di¤erent policy recommendations. This is particularly problematic because the primatives that underlie discounting analysis are di¢ cult to predict over long Mark C. Freeman, School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, United Kingdom. Email: M.C.Freeman@lboro.ac.uk. Ben Groom, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Email: B.Groom@lse.ac.uk. Author for correspondence: Mark Freeman. time horizons. For example, the growth rate of aggregate consumption and the rate of return to capital over the next four centuries are essentially unknown today, since they depend on a number of unpredictable events including technological change, political and social unrest, environmental change and even pandemics (e.g. Almond (2006) ).
Recognition of the uncertainty surrounding the discount rate has lead to a burgeoning literature on the term structure of certainty-equivalent social discount rates. This has recently been expertly reviewed by Gollier (2012) and Arrow et al. (2012) . The overwhelming consensus coming from these contributions is that, for risk free projects, the term structure should be declining with the time horizon. This view is exempli…ed by a recent Policy Forum article in Science, in which it is argued that where we are uncertain about the future "there are compelling arguments for using a declining discount rate schedule" (Arrow et al. 2013, p. 350) . Furthermore, this consensus has been very in ‡uential. Declining term structures can now be found in government guidelines in the UK and France, and in recent advice to the Norwegian government. Declining term structures are also being considered in the US. In the UK, declining discount rate schedules (DDR) have been used in the governmental economic analysis of the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail link and for capital budgeting purposes by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. They have also featured heavily in discussions concerning the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). It can be argued that DDRs have already in ‡uenced public investment decisions in the UK.
The DDRs used in government policy are typically based on a 'certainty-equivalent' discount rate which embodies uncertainty in the future. One argument for a declining certainty-equivalent supposes that for some random variable x H , the present value, p H ; of a certain $1 arriving at time H is given by p H = E [exp ( Hx H )]. The H period certaintyequivalent discount rate is then given by R H = H 1 ln (p H ). Exponential functions are convex, and this convexity becomes more pronounced as the time horizon, H; increases and with greater uncertainty in x H . The certainty-equivalent R H declines with the time horizon due to the e¤ect of Jensen's inequality to its lowest feasible value as the time horizon extends to in…nity, where the limiting value of the certainty-equivalent depends on the persistence of x H over time. This simple structure, which is the focus of the paper, is quite general since, as we discuss in the next section, x H can have a number of interpretations depending on the theoretical framework employed. While this theoretical argument is now widely accepted, putting the theory into practice requires us to make assumptions about the probability density function (pdf) of x H : f H (x H ). The standard approach in the literature is for each author to take one or more speci…c parameterizations of f H (x H ) and apply these as if they re ‡ected the true nature of our knowledge. 'The future is unknown but we can describe our uncertainty pretty accurately' has largely been the approach so far.
We take a less sanguine view of what we can say about the true form of f H (x H ). We focus on the observation that, not only do we not know what the future holds, but we also cannot perfectly characterize the nature of our uncertainty about it. We most likely have little idea from which distribution the primitives of the discount rate are coming when considering a time-span of many decades or centuries.
1 This leads to our central question: 'how sensitive is the term structure of social discount rates to di¤erent plausible characterizations of f H (x H )?' While we recognize the philosophy of Knight (1921) that maintains that such uncertainty is immeasurable, we take an alternative approach here.
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Our framework is based on the willingness of the social planner to make decisions on the basis of speci…c assumptions about f H (x H ) that are su¢ ciently uncontroversial for reasonable people to be able to agree upon them today. Speci…cally, we consider a set of probability density functions such that all economists agree that f H (x H ) is a member of this set, yet there is no consensus as to which element of the set best describes f H (x H ).
A common way in which to describe probability density functions (pdf) is via summary statistics such as the moments of the distribution: e.g. the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, a reasonable set that people might be able to agree contains f H (x H ) is that which contains all pdfs de…ned on the same support that share the same …rst K 4 moments. 4 Of course, the number of pdfs contained in such a set is in…nite, but using a powerful method pioneered by Karlin and Studden (1966) it is possible to determine upper and lower limiting pdfs within the set, and hence 'sharp bounds'on the social discount rate based on the level of consensus associated with the set. Using this technique we present sharp bounds for R H based on a number of di¤erent DDR models. This allows us to then calculate plausible ranges for the present values of three long-term cash ‡ow forecasts; (i) the social cost of carbon, (ii) the estimated bene…ts of Phase 1 of the HS2 rail link, and (iii) the costs of decommissioning the previous generation of nuclear power stations within the UK.
As is to be expected, the less we agree upon about the future, the more uncertain we are about the "true"present value. For example, using gamma discounting (Weitzman (2001) ) as our underlying DDR model, even if there is agreement on the …rst four moments of the 1 As we discuss below, in the case of heterogeneous expert opinions, uncertainty over the true form of f H (x H ) has a somewhat di¤erent interpretation.
2 The derivation of a declining schedule of discount rates in a Knightian uncertainty environment has recently been developed by Iverson (Forthcoming) .
3 Although it is possible that these assumptions will be falsi…ed with the bene…t of hindsight. 4 To avoid issues around in…nities, as famously discussed in a related context through the 'dismal theorem' of Weitzman (2009), we assume throughout that the …rst K moments of f H (x H ) are …nite and that, more generally, its moment generating function is de…ned. distribution, then the SCC can lie anywhere within the interval $13.6 per ton of carbon (/tC) and $46.1/tC. This is a sobering result when one considers that even agreement on the …rst moment is likely to be an optimistic assumption. In this position of relative ignorance, the estimate of the SCC can be anywhere between $5/tC and $190/tC.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that social planners should be extremely cautious when making policy decisions on intergenerational matters. If we accept that there are elements of the uncertainty surrounding the discount rate that are poorly understood, we can only be sure that the appropriate discount rate will lie within quite wide bounds even if we ignore broader issues such as Knightian uncertainty and the 'dismal theorem'of Weitzman (2009) . In such cases spot estimates of, say, the SCC will give a false impression of precision. On the up side our method provides a concrete way in which to set the boundaries of sensitivity analysis in CBA. On the down side, for intergenerational projects we may have to live with the fact that we know very little about the future evolution of the fundamentals and that the social value of such policies may be extremely uncertain. Depressingly for practitioners of CBA, we may have to look elsewhere for a decision making apparatus in these cases.
The theory of declining discount rates
In this section, we brie ‡y describe three theoretical foundations for expressions of the form p H = E [exp( Hx H )] that result in declining schedules of social discount rates.
ENPV
We start with the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) framework of Weitzman (1998) that has spawned the extensive subsequent literature on DDRs. The theoretical foundations for this approach have recently been discussed at length in Traeger (Forthcoming), Weitzman (2010), Freeman (2010) , Gollier (2009) and elsewhere. Here we followthe discussion in The di¢ culty within the ENPV framework is placing interpretation on r t . Following from the literature on the term structure of interest rates this is known to include both a risk-free and a term premium component. However, it is standard in social discounting to treat r t as a risk-free rate proxied by the yield to maturity on a Treasury bond. We follow this convention in this paper and note that Cox et al. (1981) provide at least some justi…cation for this simpli…cation. Therefore, within the ENPV approach, x H = r H where r H is the average short-term interest rate over the interval [0; H 1].
Consumption based asset pricing models
Consider a standard consumption based asset pricing framework where a representative agent gains utility u (c t ; t) from consuming c t units of the single consumption good at time t. From the Euler equation, if a project makes a certain future payment of $1 at time H and nothing at any other time, then its present value is given by:
If we assume that current consumption, c 0 , is non-stochastic and that the utility function takes time-separable power form: u 0 (c t ; t) = e t c t , with pure time preference rate and coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ; then:
In line with our focus in this paper, this can be re-written as:
As Gollier (2012) shows, the term structure that emerges from this framework depends on what is assumed about the stochastic process driving consumption growth. Several models are admissible including straightforward mean reversion with a persistent state variable, regime shifting models and models with parameter uncertainty in the mean and variance of the growth process.
Heterogeneous agent models
While much of the discounting literature focusses on uncertainty, another strand considers heterogeneity, either of preferences or opinions on the discount rate. Doing so leads to analytically similar expressions for the term structure, albeit with an entirely di¤erent interpretation.
Suppose there is an economy with i = 1; ::; N agents in which each has her own discount rate r iH ; for horizon H. In this case, the social planner must decide on the optimal way of combining these di¤erent rates. This is a contentious issue and not all approaches lead to expressions of the form p H = E [exp ( Hx H )]. For example, Heal (2012) argues that the median value of r iH might be more appropriate due to its democratic median-voter properties. Yet two heterogeneous agent models do lead to such expressions.
in Gollier (2012) , equations (9.20) and (9.21) follow Emmerling (2010) and combine the heterogeneous agents by taking a weighted average of their individual discount factors:
where the weights q i are the Pareto weights placed on agent i's utility function by the social planner. Once again, this takes a form appropriate for the focus of this paper:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure b q i and x H = r iH .
Second, following Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) , imagine a setting where each agent has his or her own rate of pure time preference, i > 0; and forecast of future economic growth, g i , but all have logarithmic utility. They then determine their individual discount rate using the Ramsey rule: r iH = i + g i . In this case, if the social discount rate is determined by equilibrium market prices that would result from each agent trading their own initial endowment, w i , according to their individual preferences, then:
Again, setting x H = r iH , this has same structure:
where the expectation is now taken with respect to the probability measure z i : Li and Löfgren (2000) and Heal and Millner (2013) look at alternative speci…cations of the intertemporal welfare function under heterogeneity and end up with similar expressions. Thinking about heterogeneity presents perhaps less intractable problems with regard to the future, since in principle one could undertake a survey of the relevant preferences or beliefs. Nevertheless, it would be extremely unrealistic to say that we can either characterize b q i or z i with precision, leading again to uncertainty about the true form of f H (x H ).
Method
In order to construct term structures of the social discount rate for use in policy decision making, several attempts have been made to characterize f H (x H ) for use in the equation
We will turn to these empirical exercises in the following section. Yet despite the best e¤orts of these endeavours, the precision presented in the eventual social discount rate schedules obscures the di¢ culty of accurately re ‡ecting our uncertainty about the future and the nature of heterogeneity.
But what is it reasonable to say that we 'know'or agree on about f H (x H )? The method that we now describe starts from a position of ignorance. We then gradually formalize several scenarios which vary in what is 'known' (in the sense of what reasonable people might agree upon for policy making purposes) about the moments and support of this pdf. We then explain how the extent of our ignorance, as measured by the number of moments of the pdf that are 'known', a¤ects the precision with which we can estimate the shape and level of the term structure of certainty equivalent social discount rates.
First consider the set of all well-de…ned probability density functions, = H , with elements g H , which are supported on a common interval [a H ; b H ]. 6 We assume that there is consensus that the "true"f H (x H ) is an element of this set, but we do not know which element it is. Next, we suppose that we only know the …rst K (non-central) moments of about f H (x H );
is the expectation operator conditional on the pdf of x H being f H . The smaller is K, the more ignorant we are about f H (x H ) ; but claiming any knowledge of the moments of the pdf allows us to narrow our search to the subset = KH = H that contains all elements g H with …rst K moments E g x k H = m kH for k K. We then de…ne strict upper and lower bounds for R H ; R uH and R lH ; by:
As expressions of the form E [exp ( Hx H )] are moment generating functions (mgf), or Laplace-Stieltjes transformations, we can invoke a powerful result from Karlin and Studden (1966) to …nd R uH and R lH . These are derived by establishing two separate, discrete pdfs which are, loosely speaking, 'at opposite ends'of the support and yet share the …rst K moments. The upper bound for the mgf is found by calculating the most extreme discrete distribution to place as much mass as possible in the left hand tail (lower values of the discount rate), while still satisfying the K moment conditions. The lower bound is found by minimizing the mass in the left hand tail. More concretely, the extreme discrete distributions place non-zero probability mass at
where the number of mass points depends on the number of moments, K, of the distribution of x H that we are willing to assume we agree upon:
. We denote these points by V qlH (v qlH ) for the lower bound of the mgf and V quH (v quH ) for the upper bound when a H = 0 (a H 6 = 0), with associated probabilities qlH and quH , where q indexes the mass points from smaller to larger values of x H . In this way it is possible to de…ne 'sharp bounds'on the term structure of the discount rate based on di¤erent levels of ignorance about the future. Consider the restricted case when a H = 0 and b H = B H ; we broaden the discussion to more general values of a H and b H in the appendix. The method of Karlin and Studden (1966) now follows from the observation that the set of functions n 1; x H ; :::; x
for H > 0 and positive integer K is a Tchebyche¤ system. This allows us to identify the properties of the discrete distributions that give sharp bounds for the mgf (see, for example, Eckberg (1977) ):
This is su¢ cient to uniquely identify each extreme discrete distribution since the number of degrees of freedom equals the number of moment constraints. For example, for even K; there are K=2 degrees of freedom on location and (K + 2) =2 1 degrees of freedom for the probabilities, giving a total number of degrees of freedom of K. It is also straightforward to verify that there are K degrees of freedom in parameter choice when K is odd. Therefore the extreme density functions are uniquely de…ned by the K moment conditions in all cases. To illustrate this technique with an example, suppose that experts agree on the …rst two moments of the distribution; K = 2. In this case the extreme distribution that generates the lower bound for E [exp ( Hx H )] contains …nite mass at the upper bound of x H : V 2lH = B H . There are now two unknowns; the value V 1lH , and its associated probability mass, 1lH .
V 1lH must be chosen from the interval (0; B H ). Given the mean and variance restrictions this point must lie below the mean, and its placement and the probability assigned must satisfy the agreed …rst two moments for the set of distributions. The upper bound extreme distribution places more emphasis on the left hand tail of the distribution, with one of the mass points at zero and the other mass point and probability chosen in relation to this.
The appendix describes the closed form solutions for V qlH , V quH , qlH and quH , which characterize the extreme discrete distributions for the cases K = 1, K = 2 and K = 3; the latter two are found in Eckberg (1977) . As noted by (Johnson and Taa¤e 1993, p.96) , "less analytically tractable cases (e.g., four or …ve non-central moments) call for use of symbolic or numerical methods for solving the nonlinear equations". We use numerical methods here. Clearly, the divergence between the sharp bounds on the moment generating function is greater if we claim only to know the …rst moment of f H (x H ). If we are willing to make stronger claims on the characteristics of f H (x H ) and suppose that we know two or more moments of the distribution, the bounds become narrower. The less ignorant we are about the future, the more certain we can be about the term structure of social discount rates.
Of course it is not our contention that economists will perfectly agree on the …rst K moments of f H (x H ) ; nor even its likely support. So, while we present results that vary in the extent of agreement over the moments of the distribution, even the scenario in which we make the least stringent claim to know only the …rst moment of f H (x H ) may exhibit a fanciful level of knowledge, particularly for distant time horizons. However, as we now show, even if we claim to know more than is realistic, the potential range over which the social discount rate might lie, [R lH ; R uH ] for any far horizon H; is often very wide. Introducing further disagreement/ignorance amongst experts will only make this range wider.
Calibration
In order to calculate the sharp bounds on the social discount rate, several ingredients are needed. Firstly, we must calculate the support of x H for each time horizon H; a H and b H . Second, we must determine the non-central moments of the distribution at each time horizon, m kH = E x k H ; in order to evaluate the impact of varying degrees of ignorance about the future. We limit our analysis to K 2 [1; 4] as discussions about probability density functions rarely go beyond kurtosis.
The approach we take employs six examples from the literature. These cover the three theoretical frameworks described in Section 2 and all result in a single declining term structure of the social discount rate. For all horizons H 400 years, we estimate a H , b H and m kH from the baseline probability density function, F H (x H ) ; that was used in each case; this section describes how this task was undertaken. 8 We then assume that experts agree that these spot estimates of a H , b H and m kH can be used for policy-making purposes. From this level of consensus regarding f H (x H ), we then calculate R lH and R uH .
ENPV
Under the ENPV model x H = r H , the average risk-free rate over the horizon of the cash ‡ow. There are a number of studies that have calibrated econometric models of Treasury bond yields in order to derive empirical schedules of the social discount rate using this ENPV approach; see, for example, Newell and Pizer (2003) , Groom et al. (2007) , Gollier et al. (2008) , Hepburn et al. (2009), and . To estimate F H here, we use the state-space model of Groom et al. (2007) . We refer to this as model "GKPP". Our calibrations are taken directly from Groom et al. (2007) . Let f t = ln (100r f t ), with r f 0 = 4%. The variable f t evolves according to:
which is an AR (1) 
Consumption based asset pricing models
To derive a declining discount rate in a consumption-based asset pricing environment, we assume throughout that ln (c t =c t 1 ) = t + e t where e t is i.i.n.d. with mean zero and variance 2 t . We also assume that the process is homoskedastic with known variance, t = , and that the parameters of the power utility function are = 2 and = 0. The two models that we consider look at the parameterization of expected consumption growth, t .
The …rst of this category are Markov regime switching models. Models of asset returns of this variety have been estimated by Cecchetti et al. (2000) for the US economy. Two states of the world are assumed to exist; good (G) and bad (B) . If, at time t 1, the world is in state G (B) then t = G ( B ) with G > B . The Markov process is such that, conditional on being in state G (B) at time t 1, the probability of remaining in the same state at time
. Following Gollier (2012), we use two such models in order to simulate the uncertainty surrounding x H . In the "Markov1" simulations, the good and bad state occur equally frequently and the latter re ‡ects economic stagnation. In the "Markov2" simulations, the bad state occurs rarely but is a severe recessionary environment. The simulations are undertaken following the procedures described for the ENPV model, with the support, E F [exp ( x H H)] and the moments m kH calculated analogously (see Appendix 2).
The third consumption based model incorporates parameter uncertainty; we call this "Param Uncert". This assumes that t = for all t, but that the value of is unknown. This approach is used as a justi…cation for the French government's position on long-term social discounting, although the arguments are based on a simple numerical example rather than an empirical analysis; see (Lebegue 2005, p.102) . To calibrate this model we follow Gollier (2012) , and assume takes one of two values, u > l with equal probability. In this case, the values of E F [exp ( Hx H )] and m kH are known in closed form through the law of total probability;
for any function h ( ) with …nite expectation. Further descriptions of the calibration are given in Appendix 2.
Heterogeneous agent models
There are two strands of heterogeneous agent model in the empirical literature on the term structure of discount rates. The …rst treats the individual agents, i, as countries or regions and uses this framework to derive a global social discount rate (Gollier et al. (2008); Gollier (2010); Emmerling (2010); Gollier (2012) ). The second empirical approach, which we follow here, is to seek expert opinion on the values of x H . Such a survey was the basis of the seminal 'gamma discounting'paper of Weitzman (2001) which reports N = 2160 survey responses, r i , from professional economists to the question: 'Taking all relevant considerations into account, what real interest rate do you think should be used to discount over time the (expected) bene…ts and (expected) costs of projects being proposed to mitigate the possible e¤ects of global climate change? '. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that, for each expert, the discount rate is independent of the time horizon, r iH = r i and therefore that the pdf F H (x H ) will also be H independent.
Empirical schedules of the social discount rate following from this survey have been reported by Weitzman (2001) , and . Here we follow the original approach taken by Weitzman (2001) . He argued that the present value of a future $1 environmental bene…t should be calculated using the sample frequency distribution of individual discount factors:
exp ( Hr i ). While some have argued that using this method to justify a theory based on probability density functions con ‡ates uncertainty and heterogeneity (e.g. ), there remain some theoretical justi…cations for this approach. For example, it follows from equation 1 if q i and c i0 are the same for all agents. If also follows from equation 2 if each agent is weighted equally: z i = 1=N for all i.
We estimate the sharp bounds for both the parametric and non-parametric descriptions of the data on expert opinions. The …rst we label as the "Gamma" model, because we follow Weitzman by using a gamma distribution to describe F H for all H with = 1:904 and = 47:231: This requires that we take a H = 0, which is the lower support of the gamma distribution. We choose the upper bound, b H by selecting the value that gives a 0.1% probability that a random variable drawn from ( ; ) will be greater than this value. This turns out to be b H = 19:12%. The bene…t of the parametric assumption is that the moment generating function and the k th non-central moments of a gamma distribution are known in closed form: E F [exp ( Hx H )] = (1 + H= ) and m kH = k Q k 1 i=0 ( + i). The second approach, which we call "Weit", is non-parametric and uses simply the sample frequency distribution of responses. This gives a H = 3% and b H = 27%, which are the lowest and highest given answers to the survey question. The k th non-central moment is now given by m kH = 2160
Results
The term structures of discount rates for the six calibrations that we consider, as given by
, are illustrated by the solid lines in Figures 1 to 4 for H 400 years. We call these the "baseline"calibrations in all cases.
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[Insert …gures 1-4 around here]
As can be seen, these models all recommend a declining term structure of discount rates, which provides robust theoretical and empirical foundations for current policy choices in the UK, France and elsewhere. That said, there are also some clear discrepancies between the di¤erent …gures. For example, for both GKPP and Markov2 the decline in the term structure occurs rapidly and then largely ‡attens out. For most of the other models the discount rate continues to noticeably decline throughout the horizon considered. The Weit model has negative values of R H for large H; while all other models have positive discount rates for all horizons considered.
To understand what makes these term structures decline, Tables 1 reports the [Insert Table 1 around here]
These six models can be broadly divided into three groups. Group 1 contains GKPP and Markov1, Group 2 contains Param Uncert, Gamma and Weit, while Group 3's only element is Markov2.
The Group 1 models are distinctive; the …rst moment of x H declines over time while the measures of spread (second to fourth non-central moments) are the lowest of all the models considered, particularly at longer horizons. In these cases the declining discount rates are primarily, but not exclusively, being driven by changes in the mean of the underlying economic process and not the Jensen's inequality e¤ect that is usually used to justify DDRs.
Elements of Group 2, by contrast, have constant …rst moment across time apart from small ‡uctuations for Param Uncert caused by the use of a …nite number of simulations. 9 With the exception of the …nal graph, these term structures have been previously reported in the literature. The "GKPP"line can be compared against Figure 3 in Groom et al. (2007) , the "Markov1"and "Markov2" lines can be respectively compared against the top line in Figure 5 .3 of Gollier (2012) and the top graph in Figure 5 .2 of the same source, the "Param Uncert" line can be compared against Figure 6 .2 of Gollier (2012) , while the "Gamma" line can be compared against Figure 1 in .
The measures of spread for these calibrations are the greatest. Therefore, unlike Group 1, it is the uncertainty over x H that drives the schedule of DDRs. Group 3 has properties that lie between those of Groups 1 and 2.
The support of the probability density functions, [a H ; b H ] for H 2 [1, 10, 50, 100, 400]; are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The ENPV model is unusual in that the range b H a H gets wider as H increases. This is particularly caused by an increase in the upper bound over the …rst 50 years. For the consumption based models, the range b H a H gets narrower as H increases. This is primarily a consequence of time diversi…cation in consumption risk. Because there is no certainty that future consumption must be above current consumption a H is frequently negative in these cases, particularly for shorter horizons. For the heterogeneous agent models the assumption is that f H (x H ) is independent of H and therefore the values of a H and b H are …xed over time, as are the non-central moments reported in Table 1 .
We would particularly draw the reader's attention to the di¤erence between the Gamma and Weit calibrations as given by the solid lines in Figure 4 . These term structures are noticeably di¤erent, particularly at long horizons, even though they are both based on the same survey data. From Table 1 we can see that the …rst four non-central moments are extremely similar for these two models and therefore they cannot explain the discrepancy between the two lines. Table 2 , though, reports that a H = 0 for Gamma while a H = 3% for Weit at all horizons H. The gamma approximation e¤ectively discards the zero and negative responses from the survey, while using the precise sample frequency does not. While only 46 (3) experts gave an answer of r i = 0%, (r i < 0%) out of a total sample size of N = 2160, the treatment of these minority responses is crucial in determining the rate of decline of the social discount rate because R H ! minfr i g = a H as H ! 1.
In Table 3 , we report an example of the discrete distributions that provide the sharp upper and lower bounds for R H ; v qlH and v quH . This is for the Markov1 model for horizons H = 50 years and H = 200 years. As described above, these bounds are determined by discrete distributions with non-zero mass in [a H ; b H ] at between (K + 1) =2 and (K + 3)=2 points. The …gures in square parentheses denote the probabilities associated with each non-zero mass point, qlH and quH .
[Insert Table 3 around here]
We calculate such discrete distributions for all models and all horizons H 400 years and the sharp bounds on the discount rate are then derived from each. These are reported as the dotted lines in Figures 1-4 .
Consider …rst the two models in Group 1. For GKPP, while the bounds are clearly distinct from the baseline calibration, the spread of potential values for R H is not particularly great. This is because the declining schedule is driven by the mean, rather than the spread, and a H remains well above zero for all horizons considered. For Markov1, while again the mean is the dominant e¤ect reducing R H with increasing H, the bounds spread is much wider than for GKPP. This is because a H remains below zero for all H considered -see Table 2 . For the three models in Group 2, the spread of possible values for R H is wide for all H and K beyond approximately 75 years. For the Markov2 model, there is great uncertainty about the value of R H at a horizon of approximately 100 years but there is more consensus for longer horizons. This is because a H continues to increase rapidly even when H is large; see again Table 2 .
Our central observation comes from these graphs. If there is a high level of agreement between economists about the partial characteristics of f H (x H ), which we would contend there is not, even then the rate with which the social discount rate declines can take a wide range of potential values. This will have obvious implications for the extent to which conclusions can be drawn from CBA of intergenerational projects.
To illustrate this point, in Table 4 we calculate a Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) in US dollars per ton of carbon ($/tC) from each of the term structures reported in Figures 1-4 using the schedule of marginal carbon damages provided by Newell and Pizer (2003) . These cash ‡ows have a horizon of 400 years, with 50% of the undiscounted costs arising by year 170.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Excluding Weit, the range of estimates for the baseline calibrations range from 8.3$/tC to 32.0$/tC. Weit is a considerable outlier, with an estimated SCC of $979.8/tC. This results from the fact that R H is negative under this model for far horizons. As a consequence very long term environmental damages are compounded rather than discounted. Again, this shows the sensitivity of the results to the choice of a H for high values of H, which is the primary feature that distinguishes the Weit model from the Gamma model.
For some models, provided K = 4, it is possible to estimate the SCC relatively accurately. For example, the GKPP (Param Uncert) model has a range of $16.3/tC ($13.6/tC) to 19.9/tC ($16.5/tC). For Markov2, the range is $8.2/tC to $9.2/tC. For many models, though, great uncertainty remains over the Social Cost of Carbon even when we assume that moments of f H (x H ) are perfectly known up to and including the kurtosis. Under Gamma (Markov1), the range is $13.6/tC ($25.2/tC) to $46.1/tC ($85.0/tC). For values of K < 4, the ranges increase substantially. For example, if we only know the mean, variance and skewness of f H (x H ) under the Markov1 model, then the SCC can lie anywhere in the range $22.6/tC -$242.2/tC.
Again, the Weit model is the outlier, with a range of potential values for the SCC of $11.6/tC -$84,592/tC when K = 4. This schedule would make it almost impossible for a policy maker to make any serious economic decisions about a wide range of climate change mitigation programmes. For K = 1, we cannot even preclude the value of one and a half million dollars per ton of carbon under this calibration.
Tables 5 reports the present value of the o¢ cial estimates of bene…ts from Phase 1 of the HS2 rail link (London to Birmingham) that is currently being considered in the UK. The cash ‡ows are taken directly from the HS2 o¢ cial website. These arise over a 75 year period to 2085, with 50% of the undiscounted bene…ts occurring by year 53. Table  6 considers instead the estimated costs of decommissioning nineteen nuclear power stations in the UK as given in the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority report and account 2012/13. While these span over a longer time horizon than HS2 (125 years), the half-life, as it were, is shorter, with 50% of the undiscounted costs occurring by year 29. Further details on these cash ‡ow estimates are available on request from the authors.
[Insert Table 5 & 6 around here]
As might be expected, given the shorter time horizons involved, the present value bounds are narrower than for the social costs of carbon. Nevertheless, particularly when K 3, the uncertainty is still of policy importance. For example, using gamma discounting and K = 3, the NPV of the bene…ts of HS2 lies between £ 20.7bn-£ 28.3bn and the present value costs of decommissioning the previous generation of nuclear power stations lies in the interval £ 44.8bn-£ 51.3bn. With lower K; this uncertainty is widened considerably further.
Conclusion
There are strong theoretical arguments for using a declining term structure of discount rates for intergenerational projects, and these are largely based on uncertainty about future growth and interest rates. So persuasive have these arguments been that they are now recognised in government policies and recommendations in the UK, France, Norway and the US. The practical question that necessarily follows is: how can uncertainty be charactersised and the theory be operationalised?
So far policy makers have sought a range of expert economists'advice on the best route forward, and the experts have provided them with empirical estimates of the certainty equiv-alent term structure of social discount rates based on speci…c theories and characterisations of uncertainty; see, for example, Gollier (2012), Arrow et al. (2012) .
The fact of the matter is, though, that we know far less about the future state of the world and the uncertainty surrounding growth and the interest rate than the complete characterisations of uncertainty that many of these models suggest. This raisies the question, how certain are we about the certainty equivalent social discount rate?
Starting from a position of relative ignorance about our knowledge of uncertainty in the future, this paper shows that, even if these experts have strongly overlapping views on the primatives of social discounting, and agree on the …rst four moments of the distribution of growth or the interest rate, the empirical term structure of the certainty equivalent social discount rate emerging from many theoretical models cannot be positioned within anything but very wide bounds, particularly for long time horizons. The obvious implication of this is that policy prescriptions become less crisp for all but the highest return public projects.
For instance viable estimates for the Social Cost of Carbon and the Net Present Values of other intergenerational project become alarming dispersed from this position of ignorance. Apparently trivial disagreements over parameterization choices can lead to signi…cant di¤er-ences in policy recommendations.
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While not quite a dismal theorem, overall this paper presents a depressing empirical …nding for practitioners of Cost Bene…t Analysis. Even if we are willing to put issues of Knightian uncertainty to one side, we must accept that we know little about the true nature of uncertainty in the distant future. This admission of ignorance means that estimated present values are likely to be so imprecise as to provide only minimal guidance to policy makers on intergenerational projects. We may have to look elsewhere for a decision making apparatus in such cases.
Appendix 1
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the method that we use for determining R uH and R lH . When f H (x H ) is supported on the interval [a H ; b H ] for a H 6 = 0, we …rst undertake a change of variables. De…ne y H = x H a H ; g H (y H ) = g H (x H ) and = KH as the set containing all elements g H (y H ). The lower bounds for R H are derived from the bounds for
and there is an analogous expression for R uH ; with the supremum replaced by the in…mum. Well de…ned probability density functions are elements of = KH if and only if they are supported on the interval [0; B H ], where B H = b H a H and if they have the same K noncentral moments, M kH for k K. These non-central moments are given by the binomial theorem:
We then use the method described in the body of the paper to …nd 
! where v qlH = V qlH + a H . An analogous expression follows for R uH . Closed form solutions for V qlH , V quH , qlH and quH are available for K 3. When K = 1, the lower bound has only one mass point which is on the mean value; V 1lH = M 1H . The upper bound has mass at V 1uH = 0 and V 2uH = B H only and the probability 1uH is set to ensure that the mean is equal to M 1H ; 1uH = (B H M 1H ) = B H . Closed form solutions for K = 2 and K = 3 are given in Eckberg (1977) . For the case K = 2:
where:
Here we describe in detail the way in which the simulations are undertaken.
' GKPP'State Space model:
The Following Groom et al. (2007) we discard simulations with 1 > 1. We then simulate the AR(1) process for 400 periods. This process can lead to some high values of r f t , particularly when 1 is close to 1, and therefore we discard simulations where r f t > 100% at any point in the 400 year horizon. In order to parameterize a H and b H , we note the minimum and maximum values taken by x H across the 25,000 simulations for all H: We then approximate a functional form: For each simulation, we set the initial state to G. For model "Markov1", G = 2%, B = 0%, G = B = 1% and t = = 3:6% while for "Markov 2", G = 2:25%, B = 6:78%, G = 2:2%, B = 48:4% and t = = 3:13%.
Following the techniques used for model GKPP, we estimate the properties of F H across 25,000 simulations. This enables us to calculate both E F [exp ( Hx H )] and the moments of x H . To parameterize a H and b H we again note the minimum and maximum values taken by x H across the 25,000 simulations for all H and use smoothing functions, a H = a (min (x H ) ; H), b H = b (max (x H ) ; H) ; to eliminate small ‡uctuations caused by the use of a …nite number of simulations.
"Param Uncert":
The calibration is based upon Gollier (2012) ; u = 3% and l = 1%. These outcomes are equally likely. The limits of the support, a H and b H ; are estimated by setting l (a H ) = 0:1% and u (b H ) = 99:9%, where u and l denote the cumulative density functions of normal variables N ( u ;
2 ) and N ( l ; 2 ) respectively. Figure 1 . This …gure presents the term structure of social discount rates as given through the ENPV setting by the state-space model of Groom et al. (2007) . The solid line is the baseline parameterization from this model, which can be compared against Figure 3 in Groom et al. (2007) . We then present upper and lower bounds on R H conditional on matching the …rst K moments of F H (x H ) for K 2 [1; 4] as reported in Figure 2. As Figure 1 , except F H (x H ) is now derived from two Markov switching models for logarithmic consumption growth. The solid line in the top graph can be compared against the top line in Figure 5 .3 of Gollier (2012) , while the solid line in the bottom graph should be compared against the top graph in Figure 5 .2 of the same source. The top graph follows Weitzman in using a gamma distribution to approximate the sample frequency of responses, while the bottom graph does not make this approximation and uses the raw sample distribution instead. Table 6 . As Tables 4 & 5 , but now the present values are associated with the costs of decommissioning the previous generation of nuclear power stations in the UK as given in the 2012/13 report and accounts of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (£ bn).
GKPP Markov1 Markov2 Param Uncert

